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A WOMAN’S WORTH* 
KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC** 
This Article examines three traditionally “taboo trades”: (1) the sale 
of sex, (2) compensated egg donation, and (3) commercial 
surrogacy. The Article purposely invokes examples in which the 
compensated provision of goods or services (primarily or 
exclusively by women) is legal, but in which commodification is 
only partially achieved or is constrained in some way. I argue that 
incomplete commodification disadvantages female providers in 
these instances, by constraining their agency, earning power, or 
status. Moreover, anticommodification and coercion rhetoric is 
sometimes invoked in these settings by interest groups who, at best, 
have little interest in female empowerment and, at worst, have 
economic or political interests at odds with it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September 2008, “Natalie Dylan” (a pseudonym adopted by 
the twenty-two-year-old Women’s Studies graduate) auctioned her 
virginity on the Web site of the Moonlite Bunny Ranch, a brothel in 
Carson City, Nevada.1 She reportedly received over 10,000 bids, the 
highest of which was $3.8 million.2 Predictably, Dylan received 
condemnation from many quarters (and, perhaps less predictably, 
praise from some).3 Critics have argued that she is degrading herself 
and women generally, risks exporting Nevada’s poor morals to the 
rest of the country, and is selling something (virginity) for profit that 
should be cherished and freely given.4 
In this Article, I explore through Dylan’s virginity auction and 
other examples some of the issues raised by such “taboo trades”—
that is, trade in which the good or service exchanged is both legal and 
alienable, but in which transfer for profit (as opposed to some other 
motivation, such as affection or altruism) is banned or limited.5 In 
doing so, I want to put to one side debates about whether the taboo 
trades considered here—the sale of sex, human eggs (or “oocytes”), 
and surrogacy services—should be legal. Although I believe that they 
should, subject to regulation, it is unnecessary for readers to accept 
that premise for current purposes. I specifically invoke examples of 
 
 1. Natalie Dylan, Why I’m Selling My Virginity, DAILY BEAST, Jan. 23, 2009, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-01-23/why-im-selling-my-virginity/; 
Moonlite Bunny Ranch, www.bunnyranch.com (last visited May 2, 2010).  
 2. Joseph Abrams, 22-Year-Old Sells Virginity Online—And Feds Can’t Do a Thing 
to Stop Her, FOXNEWS, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,480037,00.html; Dylan, supra note 1. The winning bidder, who paid a $250,000 
deposit, later withdrew from the deal, allegedly because his wife objected. Cynthia R. 
Fagan, ‘Deflower Deal’ Guy Pulls Out, N.Y. POST, May 31, 2009, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/deflower_deal_guy_pulls_out_gzj1Gdyonlv99BZ
GWb5b5J. As of publication, Dylan was still featured on the Moonlite Bunny Ranch Web 
site. See Announcement!!!, 22-Year-Old Virgin to Sell to Highest Bidder!, 
http://www.bunnyranch.com/virgin/ (last visited May 2, 2010). 
 3. See, e.g., Dylan, supra note 1 (stating that a Fortune 500 CEO congratulated her 
on her “entrepreneurial gumption”). 
 4. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 2 (discussing objections of “religious legal groups” to 
the sale); Dave Masters, Bids Hit £2.6m for Girl’s Virginity, SUN (London), Jan. 13, 2009, 
available at http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/features/article2123389.ece#ixzz0g1j3bUDP 
(“Natalie has since faced a steady stream of criticism from women and allegations from 
men over the validity of her virginity claims.”); Bari Weiss, Putting Herself on Sale, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at W11 (arguing that “there is nothing liberating about this sale”). 
 5. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 18 (1996) (defining 
market inalienability); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Forward, Show Me the Money: Making 
Markets in Forbidden Exchange, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at i, i–xiv 
(defining a “taboo trade” or “forbidden exchange,” and distinguishing it from both illegal 
items and activities and legal but inalienable items and activities). 
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legal transactions that, nonetheless, remain subject to significant 
constraints on normal market operation, arguing that these 
constraints are neither obvious nor random. Instead, they are often 
the product of unexamined instincts that fail to withstand more 
careful scrutiny, and frequently embed class and gender stereotypes. 
Like many taboo markets, the markets for sex, oocytes, and 
surrogacy present a paradox. These robust commercial industries 
attract large numbers of suppliers and consumers, yet continue to be 
regarded as socially problematic—perhaps deviant or repugnant—
and in need of strict controls. Even when legal, taboo markets, and 
those who supply them, may be stigmatized—or, alternatively, 
romantically recharacterized as altruistic nonmarket transactions—
and limited in ways that other markets are not. 
Many taboo trades, including the sale of sex, oocytes, and 
surrogacy, raise important public policy issues and may be 
characterized by asymmetries in information and bargaining power. 
As I have argued elsewhere, regulation designed to address such 
concerns is appropriate.6 However, social and legal impediments to 
taboo trades sometimes serve no purpose other than constraining 
normal market functioning or denying providers the status of 
legitimate suppliers of a valuable good or service. Although these 
impediments impose costs on all participants to the transaction—
including consumers, who bear higher prices, reduced supply, and 
increased risk—this Article concentrates primarily on the costs borne 
by providers. In the case of the taboo trades discussed in this Article, 
those providers are largely or exclusively female. 
I do not mean to suggest that the only taboo markets in which 
trade is restricted are those supplied by women. Indeed, the National 
Organ Transplant Act’s (“NOTA”)7 ban on, and the recent heated 
debates surrounding, financial incentives for organs, which raise 
similar issues, are evidence to the contrary.8 However, the purported 
 
 6. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Price and Pretense in the Baby Market, in 
BABY MARKETS: MONEY, MORALS, AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES 
41, 41–45 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010) [hereinafter Krawiec, Price and Pretense] 
(discussing the potential tensions among public policy goals, market forces, reproductive 
freedom, and parental rights raised by the baby market, including egg, sperm, and 
surrogacy markets); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for 
Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203 (2009) [hereinafter Krawiec, Altruism and 
Intermediation] (discussing information and bargaining power asymmetries in the 
surrogacy market). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 301, 98 Stat. 2339, 2346 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 274e 
(2006)). 
 8. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–51, Flynn v. 
Holder, No. CV-09-07772 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009) (challenging the constitutionality of 
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dangers of commodification and the need to protect a supposedly 
vulnerable population from the coercive effects of the marketplace 
have been especially prominent defenses of constraints on the 
markets for sex work, oocytes, and surrogacy. These defenses have 
also been widely embraced in much of the accepted academic wisdom 
on these topics, including some strands of feminist theory.9 
Women have always been the primary suppliers in the markets 
for sex and reproduction. Indeed, in some societies, sexual and 
reproductive labor traditionally have been the only valuable assets 
held by females.10 As a result, the structure, regulation, and social 
norms surrounding these markets necessarily impact women 
significantly. 
By and large, objections to markets in sex, human eggs, and 
surrogacy services—like the objections to other taboo trades—fall 
into the general categories of commodification and coercion.11 The 
“commodification” objection, in brief, relates to the purported 
degrading effect of market exchange on certain goods and services.12 
 
National Organ Transplant Act (“NOTA”) as applied to compensated bone marrow 
donation); Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Summer 2007, at 37, 38 (discussing organ-matching programs as a means to reduce organ 
shortages without triggering the repugnance prompted by direct financial incentives). 
 9. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 168–75 
(1993) (defending bans against contract pregnancy and baby selling on the grounds that 
they commodify women’s labor and children); RADIN, supra note 5, at 132–36 (discussing 
objections, including feminist objections, to prostitution); id. at 149–51 (discussing same 
with respect to commissioned adoption and paid surrogacy); MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, 
MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES 92–95, 107–119 (2001) (opposing oocyte and 
surrogacy markets on both commodification and coercion grounds).  
 10. Often, however, that asset was not controlled by the woman herself, but rather by 
her father, husband, or other male family members. Dilek Cindoglu, Virginity Tests and 
Artificial Virginity in Modern Turkish Medicine, 20 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 253, 253 
(1997) (“[T]he virginity of the bride is an asset for both her family and the groom's 
family.”); Xiao Zhou, Virginity and Premarital Sex in Contemporary China, 15 FEMINIST 
STUD. 279, 279–80 (1989) (noting that women in China “are valued as sexual and 
reproductive tools,” thus virginity is valuable and its loss is a shame on the family); see also 
sources cited infra note 23. 
 11. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 9, at xii–xiii (discussing commodification); id. at 
186 (discussing contract pregnancy as coercive); RADIN, supra note 5, at 2–8 (discussing 
commodification and coercion as objections to a variety of exchanges); JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 346 (1986) (discussing incommensurability); SHANLEY, supra 
note 9, at 92–95, 107–19 (raising commodification and coercion objections to oocyte and 
surrogacy markets); Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of 
Markets, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Delivered at Brasenose College, Oxford 
(May 11–12, 1998), in 21 TANNER LECTURES ON HUM. VALUES 87, 94–96, available at 
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/sandel00.pdf (raising commodification 
and coercion objections to certain market transactions).  
 12. The commodification objection has two variations. The first posits that the 
“alienation” for money of sexuality, reproductive labor, and other particularly intimate 
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Establishing fair and equal bargaining conditions or general 
equality in the underlying distribution of wealth cannot address the 
commodification objection. In other words, it is different from the 
“coercion” objection, which rests, instead, on the purported need to 
protect vulnerable populations against financial lures that might 
induce unwise risk-taking. 
As will be shown, both objections are poor fits to the realities of 
the specific constraints on taboo transactions discussed here. Instead, 
what unifies reactions to the three taboo trades that are the subject of 
this Article is an attempt to deny the full market status of these 
transactions, while still ensuring market operation. In other words, 
these markets are tolerated, but not embraced, and this uneasy 
accommodation directly impacts commercial providers of sex, 
oocytes, and surrogacy. 
Part I explores more fully the example of Natalie Dylan’s 
virginity auction, concluding that Dylan’s very success in profitably 
and openly tapping a taboo market fueled her critics’ hostility. If 
Dylan had charged less, promoted herself less effectively, or been less 
creative in marketing her value as a virgin, then her transaction would 
have passed into the millions of sex-for-cash transactions occurring 
yearly without notice.  
Part II compares Oakland’s medical marijuana tax with failed 
Nevada SB 369, which would have imposed a tax on the legal Nevada 
brothel industry. Both the marijuana dispensaries and the brothel 
industry (and many of the sex workers employed by it) actively 
supported their respective taxes, meaning that each perceived some 
benefit from taxation that outweighed its costs. Those benefits—most 
likely, political influence, legal security, and social legitimacy—were 
granted to the marijuana dispensaries, largely without opposition or 
debate, but not to Nevada’s brothels. 
Part III compares public, academic, and legal attitudes toward 
egg and sperm markets, noting the repeated insistence that egg 
donors are, and should be, motivated primarily by altruism and a 
desire to help the infertile, rather than by monetary interests. In 
contrast, the presumption that sperm donors are motivated primarily 
by profit-seeking is so strong that men professing altruistic motives 
may be viewed with skepticism. The culmination of these divergent 
 
items or activities harms the seller. The second contends that such sales degrade society—
and the intimate items or activities that are the subject of sale—more generally. Both 
versions have been criticized at length. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 290–93 (1999) (challenging commodification, coercion, and related 
objections to prostitution specifically, and to the sale of bodily services more generally). 
KRAWIEC.PTD5 6/29/10 7:38 PM 
1744 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
 
attitudes comes in the form of formal and informal limits on egg 
donor compensation through the same types of horizontal price fixing 
agreements long considered per se illegal in other industries. 
Part IV discusses surrogacy, noting that its social and legal 
treatment is strikingly similar to the other taboo trades discussed in 
this Article, particularly egg donation. Commercial surrogacy, despite 
being an expensive procedure, is shrouded in the rhetoric of altruistic 
gift-giving, and most jurisdictions limit payments to surrogates in 
various ways.  
I conclude that the lines separating acceptable market 
transactions from unacceptable taboo trades often stem from 
instinctive reactions of repugnance or disgust, and do not withstand 
more thoughtful analysis.13 Moreover, they may embed social 
stereotypes and biases regarding gender or class.14 The offense to 
societal sensibilities engendered by these taboo trades is moderated 
through either stigmatization, in the case of sex work, or through the 
romantic recharacterization of the transaction as one motivated 
primarily by altruism, rather than by profit-seeking, in the case of 
oocyte and surrogacy markets.  
Both mechanisms, however, represent a double-edged sword. By 
normalizing otherwise jarring transactions, these narratives facilitate 
markets that otherwise could stagnate under the weight of social 
disapproval. At the same time, the continued denial of the market 
status of these taboo trades (and, particularly, of valuable female 
sexual and reproductive labor) has consequences for the social, legal, 
and market structure of these industries, and for the consumers, 
producers, and others, including the public-at-large, affected by them. 
 
I.  LIKE A VIRGIN? YEAH, WE SELL THAT HERE  
Before leaving the Natalie Dylan example, it is worth considering 
in more detail the reactions to Dylan’s virginity auction plan, and the 
possible motivations underlying those reactions. What drives the 
attention and controversy generated by the Dylan auction? What are 
the perceived harms associated with Dylan’s actions, and in what 
 
 13. See Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-offs: Reactions to 
Transactions that Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 285–88 (1997) 
(discussing the moral outrage associated with some taboo trades); Roth, supra note 8, 
passim (discussing repugnance as a constraint on markets). See generally MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004) 
(discussing the role of disgust and shame in society and law). 
 14. NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at 287–88. 
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ways are they greater than the harms associated with similar common 
activities? In brief, the most likely sources of antagonism to Dylan’s 
entrepreneurial efforts include: (1) that Dylan is trading sex for 
money, (2) that Dylan is selling her virginity, and (3) that Dylan’s 
self-promotion and publicity attempts are repugnant. 
It is unlikely that the sex-for-money aspect of the transaction 
motivates much of the reaction to Dylan’s plans. Though the now-
familiar commodification objection is raised in the Dylan case, it 
cannot logically explain the extreme attention and backlash that 
Dylan’s actions generated. 
Dylan’s auction drew enormous national and international 
attention—and criticism—despite the thousands of legal and illegal 
sex-for-cash transactions that occur each day, largely without notice.15 
Moreover, Dylan’s auction was conducted through a brothel in 
Nevada—the only U.S. state with a legal, thriving commercial 
prostitution industry.  
Against this backdrop, it is unreasonable to believe that the sex-
for-cash aspects of the transaction drove the enormous attention 
dedicated to the event. Prostitution as an institution, of course, 
remains the subject of frequent criticism and debate, particularly 
when it involves violence, trafficking, coercion, or underage children 
(none of which are present here and which, in any event, are more 
germane to coercion objections).16 But, absent the involvement of a 
celebrity or politician, individual sex-for-cash transactions are ignored 
on a grand scale. Yet, Dylan’s was not. Thus, there is something 
specific about the Dylan transaction, beyond the exchange of sex for 
money, that drew the public’s attention, curiosity, and condemnation. 
Dylan, of course, was selling more than sex. She was selling 
virginity—a “priceless and rare commodity” in the eyes of some, 
including, presumably, her numerous bidders.17 Although the sale of 
 
 15. Estimating prostitution activity is a difficult task. In eight General Social Survey 
reports between 1991 and 2006, between 15 and 18% of American men reported having 
paid for sex at least once (in 2006, 4% reported that they had done so in the prior year). 
Similar figures are reported for Australia and much of Europe, whereas much higher 
figures are reported in some countries, including Spain (39%) and Thailand (43–50%, 
depending on marital status). Because of the stigma associated with prostitution, these 
figures may underreport the true incidence of the activity. Ronald Weitzer, Sex Work: 
Paradigms and Policies, in SEX FOR SALE 1, 2 (Ronald Weitzer ed., 2d ed. 2010).  
 16. See MARINA DELLA GIUSTA, MARIA LAURA DI TOMMASO & STEINAR STRØM, 
SEX MARKETS: A DENIED INDUSTRY 7–9 (2008) (discussing feminist debates over 
prostitution); Weitzer, supra note 15, at 3–7 (detailing debates over legalized sex work and 
contrasting the “oppression paradigm” with the “empowerment paradigm”).  
 17. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 2. Virginity has long been considered a valuable 
female asset; in some societies, the only asset that young women may hold. See Fabio 
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virginity is a less common transaction, it is no less legal in Nevada 
than the sale of sex more generally and is not unheard of.18  
Doubtless, the virginity-for-cash aspects of the transaction are a 
genuine source of consternation to some of Dylan’s critics, 
particularly those whose religious beliefs counsel that virginity should 
be preserved until marriage.19 Again, however, Dylan’s actions must 
be put into context. Today, very few females in Dylan’s age group are 
virgins,20 and many report a decidedly unromantic first-intercourse 
experience. For example, many women (particularly young women) 
report unprotected sex, being under the influence of alcohol, or a lack 
of interest in and desire for sex as part of their first sexual 
intercourse.21 
 
Mariani, The Economic Value of Virtue 2–3 (Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Working 
Paper No. 101, 2008), available at ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2008/V08101.pdf 
(reviewing the value of virginity as a marketable asset over time and across cultures). 
 18. See, e.g., Mariani, supra note 17, at 2–4 (discussing virginity’s value); Deborah 
Arthurs, ‘I Was Attracted to Him, So I Enjoyed It’: Teen Who Auctioned Off Her Virginity 
for £8,800 Reveals Details of Her First Time, MAIL ONLINE, May 20, 2009, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1180858/I-attracted-I-enjoyed-Teen-auctioned-
virginity-8-800-reveals-details-time.html; Sue Ryan, For Sale: 13-Year-Old Virgin, 
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 13, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1584988/For-
sale-13-year-old-virgin.html (discussing virginity auctions as a rite-of-passage into 
prostitution in some poor Indian communities); Nick Squires, Italian Model Plans to Sell 
Virginity for 1m Euros, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/europe/italy/2971511/Italian-model-plans-to-sell-virginity-for-1m-euros.html; 
Student ‘Sells Virginity’ via Web, BBC NEWS, Mar. 21, 2004, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/ 
mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/bristol/somerset/3554121.stm. 
 19. Cf. Elizabeth Landau, What Is Virginity Worth Today?, CNN, Jan. 22, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/01/22/virginity.value/index.html (discussing the Dylan 
auction, and the anthropological, social, and religious importance of virginity preservation 
until marriage). 
 20. See Michael L. Eisenberg et. al., Who Is the 40-Year-Old Virgin and Where Did 
He/She Come From? Data from the National Survey of Family Growth, 6 J. SEXUAL MED. 
2154, 2158 (2009) (finding that only 8.3% of females, including self-identified lesbians, 
aged 25–29 report “heterosexual virginity”); Laura Duberstein Lindberg & Susheela 
Singh, Sexual Behavior of Single Adult American Women, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 27, 29 tbl.2 (2008) (reporting that 82.6% of single female respondents 
aged 20–29 report to having had vaginal sexual intercourse with a male). 
 21. Rodger Doyle, Teen Sex in America: Virginity into the Third Millenium Takes an 
Uptick, SCI. AM., Jan. 2007, at 30, 30 (noting that a quarter of fifteen to sixteen year-old-
females reported that their first experience with sexual intercourse was unprotected); 
Barbara C. Leigh, John Schafer & Mark T. Temple, Alcohol Use and Contraception in 
First Sexual Experiences, 18 J. BEHAV. MED. 81, 90–91 (1995) (reporting their own data 
and discussing prior research on the rate of alcohol use and first sexual intercourse); Susan 
L. Rosenthal et al., Sexual Initiation: Predictors and Developmental Trends, 28 SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED DISEASES 527, 531 (2001) (“Even [the large number of teens] who 
characterized their [first] intercourse as voluntary described it as not being particularly 
desired.”). Many studies of this nature are interested in, and report, the connection 
between risky behavior and teens’ first sexual intercourse. Dylan, at age twenty-two, is 
obviously in a different age group.  
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Given these realities, the bulk of the virginity-for-cash objections 
seem to rest, at best, on a highly romanticized view of most females’ 
first experience with sexual intercourse. Moreover, even granting the 
(rather implausible) assumption that negative reactions from the 
general public and media stem from the virginity-for-cash aspects of 
the Dylan auction, it seems even less likely that this elevation of the 
importance of female virginity and sexual purity drives the many 
negative reactions from women themselves, including some feminists. 
Aside from reinforcing a concept of virginal sanctity that many 
women reject, to contend that the sale of virginity is more 
problematic than the sale of sex by a non-virgin is to contend that 
women should be free to commodify only that which is less 
valuable—that which will produce less income. 
Like commodification objections, coercion is also a common 
refrain in debates over legalized sex markets. Yet, coercion objections 
are an especially ill fit in the Dylan case. Is it reasonable to assume 
that Dylan—an educated young woman who managed to garner an 
offer for a single sexual encounter that exceeds what most people 
(much less most sex workers) earn in an entire lifetime—is more 
coerced than other sex workers? Common sense suggests that the 
answer is “no.” Yet, Dylan received far more attention—and 
criticism—than the average (anonymous and largely ignored) sex 
worker. 
Finally, it is possible that Dylan’s critics feel a certain sense of 
repugnance toward her aggressive self-promotion and advertising of 
her “wares.” Threads of this concern are visible in criticism from both 
the Left and the Right.22 At some level, these reactions are 
understandable. After all, Dylan is aggressively pushing societal 
boundaries and turning historical stereotypes on their head in a 
variety of potentially disturbing ways.23 
 
 22. Compare, e.g., Weiss, supra note 4 (criticizing Dylan’s “self-pimping” and arguing 
that, as a result of her actions and similar third-wave feminist attitudes, “feminism, which 
used to stand for a clear set of values—most basic among them, that women are not sex 
objects and must refuse to be treated as such—has been reduced to the mere right to make 
a choice”), with, e.g., Abrams, supra note 2 (reporting concerns of some religious legal 
groups that Dylan’s Internet promotion and advertising may export Nevada’s immorality 
to the rest of the country).  
 23. By auctioning her virginity, Dylan is capitalizing on an ancient practice in which, 
historically, young girls had little agency. Often they were sold as virgins into prostitution 
or marriage by fathers or pimps. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. SANGER, THE HISTORY OF 
PROSTITUTION: ITS EXTENT, CAUSES AND EFFECTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 413 
(1974) (stating that in rural Sumatra “interest causes the parents to be watchful of their 
daughters, because the selling price of a virgin is far above that of a woman who has been 
defiled”); id. at 391 (reporting that in Berber culture, “[a] virgin may be purchased, either 
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Moreover, at the heart of the commodification objection lies the 
contention that one person’s taboo transaction degrades for all the 
intimate items and activities that are the subject of sale.24 Dylan’s 
highly public approach, with numerous television talk show 
appearances and mainstream and Internet media attention, brought 
her actions into the living room of unwilling observers, fueling fears 
that her actions would affect us all. 
Yet objections stemming from Dylan’s self-promotion, self-
pimping, and aggressive marketing should also give pause: is conduct 
undertaken with adept self-marketing—in other words, a taboo 
transaction calculated to maximize the autonomy and economic gains 
to the supplier—really more objectionable than the same product 
offered less effectively? The answer to this question may be “yes,” 
though not consciously so, and relates to what I believe is at the heart 
of the distaste prompted by the Dylan virginity auction and the other 
taboo trades discussed in this Article. 
The commodification objection, by its very nature, is more 
outraged by a taboo trade—here, the sale of virginity—undertaken 
openly, aggressively, and in a public, intentional, and highly 
deliberative manner (in other words, through the same mechanisms 
likely to increase Dylan’s agency, self-control, and monetary reward) 
than by the same activity pursued covertly or with shame.25 For that 
reason, commodification objections are an uncomfortable vehicle 
through which to package concerns about women’s economic and 
social well-being.26 If Dylan had promoted herself less effectively, 
 
as a wife or a concubine, for a horse”); Mary Beard & John Henderson, With This Body I 
Thee Worship: Sacred Prostitution in Antiquity, 9 GENDER & HIST. 480, 484 (1997) 
(discussing Herodotus’s story of the “rounding up” of virgins in Babylon to be auctioned 
off for marriage); Ryan, supra note 18 (discussing virginity sales as a rite of passage into 
prostitution in India). Moreover, Dylan is exploiting, by muddying, a classic good girl/bad 
girl, virgin/whore divide—an exploitation that she openly acknowledges. See Interview by 
Tyra Banks with Natalie Dylan, on The Tyra Banks Show (CW television broadcast Nov. 
3, 2008), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=do3otUSbTpA.  
 24. See supra notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text (discussing commodification). 
 25. In other words, such public, intentional, highly deliberative acts impact Society’s 
sensibilities most profoundly, particularly when the actor fails to express the shame or 
remorse normally exhibited by those caught in a comparable social transgression. 
Consider, for example, whether reactions to Dylan’s plans would have been more muted 
had she said instead, “I’m so ashamed about this, but I need the money and feel this is 
necessary," rather than proudly proclaiming her virginity sale an empowering, pro-choice 
act. Dylan, supra note 1; Interview by Tyra Banks with Natalie Dylan, supra note 23. 
 26. This tension is similar to the “double bind” recognized by Margaret Jane Radin. 
Radin, however, ultimately supports some forms of partial commodification. See infra 
notes 106–08 and accompanying text (discussing Radin’s approach to partial 
commodification).  
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garnered less attention, or generated lower financial returns, then her 
auction would have been treated with the same relative indifference 
accorded the millions of similar trades that occur each year, largely 
without notice.  
The taboo nature of Dylan’s transaction provided her with 
tangible monetary benefits, of course: the rarity of such virginity 
auctions is what promises such fantastic returns. But the role of 
stigma as a barrier to market entry is well-discussed in the literature 
on taboo markets, reducing the opportunities for would-be virginity 
auctioneers and, given certain assumptions, decreasing returns to 
suppliers as a group.27 
II.  SEE ME, FEEL ME, TOUCH ME, TAX ME 
In July of 2009, Oakland, California, became the first U.S. city to 
levy a special tax on the proceeds from medical marijuana sales.28 The 
tax passed with the support of the city council and by a landslide vote, 
with about eighty percent of voters endorsing the tax.29 No formal 
opposition emerged to the legislation, although some believe that the 
tax “ ‘sends the wrong message’ ” regarding the social acceptability of 
drug use.30 But, says Oakland city councilwoman Rebecca Kaplan, 
“ ‘Given that the medical cannabis dispensaries are something that 
was legalized in California, why not have revenue from it?’ ”31 
 
 27. See, e.g., Mark Koyama, Evading the ‘Taint’ of Usury: Complex Contracts and 
Segmented Capital Markets, 1–33 (Econ. Series Working Papers, No. 412, 2008) 
(demonstrating that the religious ban on lending money with interest created a barrier to 
entry that enabled secular rulers, the Church, and a small number of merchant bankers to 
earn rents); Marina Della Giusta, Maria Laura Di Tommaso & Steinar Strøm, Who Is 
Watching? The Market for Prostitution Services, 22 J. POPULATION ECON. 501, 502–16 
(2009) (discussing the role of stigma in the supply, demand, and price of prostitution 
services). 
 28. Oakland’s Measure F became effective January 1, 2010, and amends Oakland’s 
Business Tax (Chapter 5.04 of the Oakland Municipal Code) by adding section 5.04.480 to 
establish a new tax rate for “Cannabis Businesses” of $18 for every $1,000 of gross receipts 
from the businesses’ activity in Oakland. Previously, cannabis businesses in Oakland were 
taxed at the rate for retail sales businesses of $60 per year for the first $50,000 of gross 
receipts, and $1.20 for each $1,000 thereafter. City Of Oakland, Ballot Measure F, 
available at http://www.oaklandnet.com/documents/WebInfoJuly2009.pdf; Oakland City 
Council, Res. No. 81925 C.M.S. (Apr. 21, 2009), available at 
http://clerkwebsvr1.oaklandnet.com/attachments/21843.pdf. 
 29. Oakland, California Passes Landmark Marijuana Tax, CNN, July 22, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/22/california.pot.tax/index.html; Stu Woo, 
Oakland Council Backs a Tax on Marijuana, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124105239168771233.html. 
 30. Woo, supra note 29 (quoting a Southern California resident who recently founded 
Coalition for a Drug Free California). 
 31. Oakland, California Passes Landmark Marijuana Tax, supra note 29. 
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Other cash-strapped municipalities and states, seeking to close 
budget shortfalls, may try to follow Oakland’s lead. On July 15, 2009, 
the Los Angeles City Council proposed a tax on medical marijuana;32 
Berkeley, San Francisco, and other California cities may consider 
similar taxes;33 and California Assemblyman Tom Ammiano has 
proposed legislation to legalize and tax marijuana in California that 
would generate an estimated $1.4 billion in state revenue per year.34 
Compare this to the story of Nevada Senate Bill No. 369 (“SB 
369”),35 which would have imposed a special tax on the legal Nevada 
brothel industry.36 Unlike the Oakland pot tax, SB 369 died in the 
spring of 2009 after a 3–4 vote in the state’s Senate Taxation 
Committee, despite support from many sex workers and the brothel 
industry.37 
Noting the state’s desperate fiscal situation, Senate Taxation 
Committee Chairman Bob Coffin supported the tax, which he 
estimated would generate an additional $2 million per year in state 
revenues.38 Coffin argued that, although the brothel industry 
welcomed the tax and the idea of generating tax revenue from the 
brothels had been discussed for years, “ ‘people weren’t willing to get 
their hands dirty.’ ”39 “ ‘I don’t know why people won’t recognize that 
 
 32. Julie Strack, Oakland Voters OK a Tax on Medical Pot, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2009, 
at A4. 
 33. Angela Woodall, Medical Marijuana Touted as Cure for Cities’ Budget Woes, 
MONTCLARION (Alameda, Cal.), July 31, 2009, at 2A (“Other California cities, including 
Berkeley, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, and Los Angeles, have all discussed a tax on medical 
marijuana or have plans to pursue a tax.”). 
 34. John Diaz, Oakland Finds Peace with Its Pot Clubs, S.F. CHRON., July 19, 2009, at 
E2; see also Wyatt Buchanan, State Debates Legalizing Marijuana, S.F. GATE, Oct. 29, 
2009, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-10-29/bay-area/17184614_1_marijuana-taxes-pot 
(discussing the hearings on AB 390). 
 35. S. 369, 2009 Leg., 75th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2009), available at 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/75th2009/Bills/SB/SB369.pdf. 
 36. Id. The bill would have imposed an excise tax in the amount of five dollars per day 
on any patron using the services of a prostitute, established an office of Ombudsman for 
Sex Workers, and created an account in the State General Fund for expenditure to carry 
out the duties of Ombudsman. Id. 
 37. Proposed Nevada Prostitution Tax Dies On 3–4 Committee Vote, KVBC NEWS 3, 
Apr. 10, 2009 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Similar bills were proposed, 
but never passed, in prior years. Nevada Brothels Want to Be Good Neighbor: Legal 
Businesses Seek to Pay Taxes, MSNBC, May 10, 2005 [hereinafter Nevada Brothels Want 
to Be Good Neighbor], http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7805733/.  
 38. Prostitution Tax Proposed in Nevada, NPR, Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=102314296. 
 39. Id. 
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we have a legal industry,’ ” said Coffin. “ ‘I’m willing to go in and do 
the dirty work if no one else will.’ ”40 
The overwhelming support for each of these proposed taxes from 
the targeted taxpayers—California marijuana dispensaries and 
Nevada brothels—is both unusual and, at first blush, surprising. 
Normally, industries seek tax concessions, rather than tax liability.41 
Yet, Oakland’s four legal cannabis clubs led the effort to get the tax 
approved, though the new tax will impose on them an estimated 
additional yearly tax burden of between $400,000 and over $1 
million.42 Los Angeles’s medical marijuana dispensaries support a 
similar tax,43 and the Nevada brothel industry (and many of the sex 
workers employed by it) have long supported taxation and testified in 
favor of the proposed tax during debate on the issue.44 
The political and other issues surrounding the municipal medical 
marijuana tax are, of course, not identical to those posed by the 
Nevada state brothel tax. Nonetheless, the two events raise several 
interesting common questions. First, why would any industry actively 
seek to increase its tax liability? Second, why would any government 
facing budget shortfalls and cutbacks in important state services forgo 
additional tax revenue, particularly when the industry subject to the 
proposed tax favors it and, in fact, has lobbied for taxation? 
A. Courting Taxes: The Industry Story 
Why might the Nevada brothels and California marijuana 
dispensaries be so eager to pay additional taxes? Both are highly 
profitable businesses operating at the edge of legality and social 
acceptance, whose entire business could be eradicated through a 
single legislative decision. The possibility of an additional tax burden 
affects this calculus in at least three ways. 
First, if the state derives revenue from an industry, that industry 
is likely to wield more political clout. Moreover, as the state’s 
dependence on those revenues increases, it is less likely to terminate 
or jeopardize them by outlawing or significantly curtailing the activity 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Recent attempts to control obesity rates and the associated health care costs, for 
example, have resulted in proposals to heavily tax some high-calorie foods and beverages. 
Makers of these products have been vocal opponents of such taxes. See, e.g., Muhtar Kent, 
Coke Didn’t Make America Fat, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2009, at A17. 
 42. Woo, supra note 29. 
 43. Gene Maddaus, Hahn Wants to Tax LA Marijuana Dispensaries, DAILYBREEZE, 
July 15, 2009, www.dailybreeze.com/ci_12846576. 
 44. See Proposed Nevada Prostitution Tax Dies on 3–4 Committee Vote, supra note 37.  
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through onerous regulations.45 These are important considerations for 
traditionally taboo industries, such as sex and marijuana. 
Second, although few today contend that applying a general tax 
to disapproved activities carries symbolic weight,46 the special 
taxation of a legal good or activity implicitly suggests its acceptance as 
part of mainstream culture and economic activity. Taxation, then, can 
sometimes purchase a measure of legitimacy.47  
Although “sin taxes” are designed to discourage an activity by 
increasing the associated economic costs and conveying public 
disapproval, the special taxation of legal activities does at least 
recognize the taxed product or service as a major economic activity.48 
Indeed, this potential legitimizing effect has been a source of 
historical resistance to some sin taxes, including slave taxes,49 and 
 
 45. Cf. Stephanie Saul, Government Gets Hooked on Tobacco Tax Billions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2008, at WK3 (arguing that state and federal reliance on tobacco tax 
revenues “essentially provides a financial cushion for state governments and could be 
viewed as a government guarantee for the survival of the tobacco industry”); Young 
Kyung Do & Kidong Park, Local Governments’ Dependence on Tobacco Tax Revenue: A 
Deterrent to Tobacco Control in the Republic of Korea, 87 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
692, 692–99 (2009) (“The main results of this study show that local governments’ 
dependence on TCT revenue is associated with lower commitment to tobacco control in 
the Republic of Korea.”). 
 46. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 213–22 (1961) (holding income 
from illegal activity taxable); Boris I. Bittker, Taxing Income from Unlawful Activities, 25 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 130, 140–47 (1975) (tracing Supreme Court case law on the 
inclusion in taxable income of the proceeds from illegal activities and concluding that, as a 
policy matter, inclusion is appropriate). 
 47. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (arguing that the law’s denial of housework’s “status as work is 
costly to those who perform it”); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 
1571–74, 1589–99 (1996) (arguing that the failure to tax nonmarket housework 
delegitimizes it and also causes women to forego economic benefits, including social 
security, Medicare, and disability). But see Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory 
Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521, 1538–40 (1998) (contesting Staudt’s claims regarding the 
symbolic effect of taxing housework). 
 48. See Mark Thornton, Prohibition: The Ultimate Tax, in TAXING CHOICE: THE 
PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 171, 172 (William F. Shughart II ed., 
Transaction Publishers 1998) (1997) (“[S]ome radical prohibitionists oppose selective 
excise taxation on the grounds that it represents an alliance between their government and 
the ‘forces of evil.’ ”). The legitimizing effect, if any, of special taxes on illegal activities 
(typically, excise taxes on illegal drugs) is more contestable. See, e.g., Waters v. Farr, 291 
S.W.3d 873, 882–87 (Tenn. 2009) (discussing the history of the taxation of illegal 
substances at both the federal and state levels). 
  Related to “sin taxes” are Pigouvian taxes, designed to force actors to internalize 
the negative costs associated with their actions. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette 
Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, 9 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 51 (1995) 
(discussing cigarette taxes as a sin tax and a Pigouvian tax). 
 49. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 338 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) [Fisher Ames of 
Massachusetts] (“[N]o one could suppose him favorable to slavery; he detested it from his 
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courts have struggled with the potential unseemliness of collecting 
public revenues from condemned activities.50 At the very least, it is 
difficult to pretend that an activity is not occurring if we specifically 
tax and derive public revenue from it. 
Third, being seen as a “good neighbor” who contributes to the 
local economy and provides tangible public benefits, such as funding 
for schools, parks, and the like, can increase public acceptance of a 
particular business or industry. Much corporate charitable giving, for 
example, is defended on exactly this basis.51 
B. Avoiding Taxes: The Government’s Story 
The other interesting side of the coin, however, is why any 
government would forgo a potential additional revenue source, 
particularly in times of economic hardship. Just as industries typically 
seek to minimize their tax burden, governments typically seek to 
maximize their tax base. 
 
soul; but he had some doubts whether imposing a duty on the importation would not have 
the appearance of countenancing the practice.”); 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1025 (1804) 
[Thomas Lowndes of South Carolina] (“When a Government, by laying taxes, derives a 
revenue from a trade, and by that means participates in the profits and the gains of it, it is 
in my opinion giving an approbation of it.”); id. at 1029 [Roger Griswold of Connecticut] 
(“[B]ut if the raising of it [tax revenues from slavery] be connected with the passage of a 
law that recognizes a traffic in human flesh . . . I, for one, must protest against it."); see 
also, Joel S. Newman, Slave Tax as Sin Tax: 18th and 19th Century Perspectives, 101 TAX 
NOTES 1019, 1026–28 (2003) (excerpting the above quotes and discussing the moral 
debates surrounding slave taxes in the antebellum United States). Proponents of slave 
taxes disputed the characterization of slave taxes as legitimizing. Id. (“In taxing it [slavery] 
we do not assume its rightfulness. We only assume its undeniable existence as a fact, and 
nothing else.” (quoting Charles Sumner of Massachusetts)). 
 50. See, e.g., Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 566–67 (2d Cir. 1926). The case 
held the defendant’s illicit liquor income taxable despite noting  
[t]hat the winnings of a professional gambler, the loot of a burglar, the bribes of a 
dishonest official, the wages of a prostitute, or the profits of any criminal 
commerce should not be regarded as income, but should for reasons of public 
policy be regarded as beneath the contempt of the law, is a proposition not 
without attraction.  
Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 51, 62 (Del. 1991) (finding that Occidental 
Petroleum received an economic benefit from its charitable donation to Los Angeles 
County Art Museum, in the form of goodwill); 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1801 
(2009) (observing that corporate charitable donations are generally upheld as a means of 
“increasing goodwill and promoting patronage”); Graham Bowley, $500 Million and 
Apology from Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at A1 (suggesting that Goldman Sachs 
created a large charitable fund in an attempt to quell public anger over its large bonuses 
and role in the financial crisis). 
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The public statements of Nevada’s legislators, governor, and 
citizen opposition groups explicitly invoked an unwillingness to 
provide a stamp of government approval to Nevada’s brothel industry 
as the source of opposition to the brothel tax.52 This resistance is 
consistent with other Nevada laws and policies. Although prostitution 
is legal in Nevada, the state continues to keep the industry at a 
distance. For example, in addition to the refusal to impose a special 
business tax on brothels, the state also restricts their advertising and 
prohibits their operation in the state’s two largest urban areas: Las 
Vegas and Reno.53 
In contrast, California is one of only thirteen states to legalize 
medical marijuana, and marijuana distribution is still illegal under 
federal law.54 Yet, the increasing political palatability of pot taxes—
along with other factors—may signal a change in public (or, at least, 
Californians’) perspectives on the legitimacy of this activity.55 
 
 52. Brendan Riley, Brothel Tax Fails to Arouse Nevada: Sin State Has Never Taxed 
Legal Sex Biz, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Apr. 5, 2009, at A8 (noting that 
opposition to the bill is rooted in fears that taxing the industry legitimizes it); Nevada 
Brothels Want to Be Good Neighbor, supra note 37 (attributing the governor’s opposition 
to his belief that the bill would “affirm[] the industry”). 
 53. Nevada Brothels Want to Be Good Neighbor, supra note 37. Ten Nevada counties 
authorize prostitution through local ordinance, two have no laws on the subject, and two 
(those containing the cities Reno and Las Vegas) prohibit it. Prostitution Tax Proposed in 
Nevada, supra note 38. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.345(8) (LexisNexis 2005) 
(prohibiting the licensing of houses of prostitution in counties with a population of 400,000 
or more); WASHOE COUNTY, NEV., CODE ch. 53, § 170 (2009), available at 
www.co.washoe.nv.us/clerks/files/pdfs/county_code/Chapter053.pdf (prohibiting 
prostitution under heading of “disorderly conduct”). Nonetheless, two of the three 
favorable Committee member votes were from Las Vegas senators. Proposed Nevada 
Prostitution Tax Dies on 3–4 Committee Vote, supra note 37.  
 54. Roger Parloff, How Pot Became Legal: Medical Marijuana Is Giving Activists a 
Chance to Show How a Legitimized Pot Business Can Work. Is the End of Prohibition 
Upon Us?, FORTUNE, Sept. 18, 2009, at 141. In October 2009, however, the Obama 
administration formally clarified that it would not spend federal enforcement or 
prosecutorial resources on medical marijuana providers operating “in clear and 
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws.” Memorandum from David W. Ogden, 
Deputy Attorney Gen., to Selected United States Attorneys on Investigations and 
Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), available 
at http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/192. 
 55. A recent Field Poll indicates that fifty-six percent of Californians favor legalizing 
and taxing marijuana. Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, Field Research Corp., While 
California Voters Prefer Spending Cuts to Tax Increases to Resolve the State Budget Deficit, 
Majorities Oppose Cutbacks in Ten of Twelve Spending Categories, FIELD POLL, Apr. 30, 
2009, at 2, available at http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2306.pdf. 
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C. The Results 
The differing outcomes of the Oakland pot and Nevada brothel 
tax efforts are meaningful in both tangible and intangible ways. Both 
the dispensaries and the brothel industry (and many of the sex 
workers employed by it) actively supported the taxes, meaning that 
they perceived some benefit from taxation that outweighed its costs. 
As discussed, these benefits are most likely political influence, legal 
security, and social legitimacy. The medical marijuana dispensaries 
were granted these benefits—largely without debate or opposition—
whereas the brothels were not. The brothel tax also would have 
provided more direct benefits to sex workers through the creation 
and funding of an Ombudsman’s office providing counseling, job 
training, and other social services to sex workers.56 
What are the countervailing public costs and benefits of 
Nevada’s “no tax” stance? The decision clearly imposes public costs 
in terms of forgone revenues. Presumably, the continued denial of sex 
work as an important economic and social institution in Nevada is a 
benefit in the eyes of the bill’s opponents, and this rationale was 
invoked in opposition to the bill.57 
This tendency to stigmatize sex work, rather than acknowledge 
its market status, while at the same time tolerating the industry as one 
providing a necessary service, is neither new nor limited to Nevada. 
In fact, it pervades the history of society’s uneasy accommodation of 
prostitution.58 
As with the Natalie Dylan example discussed in Part I, the taboo 
nature of sex markets undoubtedly confers some benefit to 
providers—in this case, a lower tax burden than would have prevailed 
if the brothel tax had passed. Yet, by their support of taxation, the 
 
 56. See S. 369, § 30, 2009 Leg., 75th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2009), available at 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/75th2009/Bills/SB/SB369.pdf. 
 57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 58. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at 286–88. (discussing historic fears of the 
particularly dangerous nature of prostitution as both necessary—in order to satisfy male 
sexual desires that, if unmet, would seek other more harmful outlets—yet in need of strict 
control, lest female sexuality assume too much power and “fallen women” undermine the 
institution of marriage); Kathryn Hausbeck & Barbara G. Brents, Nevada’s Legal 
Brothels, in SEX FOR SALE, supra note 15, at 255, 273–76 (stating that the Nevada Brothel 
Association “believes that keeping quiet is strategically best,” that prostitution must 
remain “a largely hidden exchange” in order to coexist with the local community, and 
discussing other industry attempts at “quiet compliance” in order to preserve the status 
quo).  
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brothel industry and its employees signaled their assessment that the 
benefits of taxation outweighed the burdens.59  
Returning to the same commodification, coercion, and 
repugnance concerns raised in connection with the Dylan virginity 
auction, the societal willingness to tolerate certain taboo transactions, 
so long as they are relegated to the shadows, is highlighted even more 
starkly by Nevada’s failed brothel tax. Commodification and coercion 
objections were largely absent from the tax debate, as deriving 
additional state revenue from an already legal activity is rarely 
perceived as additionally commodifying or coercive.60 Instead, the 
primary articulated objection to the tax was the desire to avoid a 
public stamp of approval on sex work—in other words, a refusal to 
imply that sex work is a lucrative business in Nevada, similar to many 
others. One might suggest, then, that the sex industry pays the price 
for the state’s desire to derive the benefits from legal prostitution 
while still denying full market status to sex work.  
III.  SUNNY SAMARITANS OR ENTREPRENEURS? 
In June 2009, in a sharp divergence from the guidelines of some 
scientific organizations and the laws of other states, New York 
became the first state to allow taxpayer-funded researchers to pay 
women for oocytes used in stem cell research.61 The decision is 
controversial, both because of the underlying debate surrounding 
stem cell research, and because of a lingering conviction in some 
quarters that women should not receive payment in exchange for 
reproductive material.62 Although there are many differences 
between egg donation and sperm donation (as well as between egg 
 
 59. Cf. Giusta et al., supra note 27, at 514 (“[P]olicies that recognise prostitution as a 
job and reduce the stigma associated with it will have the effect of increasing the marginal 
net gain of supplying prostitution and increase the marginal willingness to pay for 
prostitution. This should, in a closed economy, have the effect of increasing the price of 
prostitution and, . . . also increase the quantity supplied.”). 
 60. Indeed, some provisions of the failed bill were designed to address trafficking 
concerns and provide social services to sex workers—actions aimed at reducing the 
coercion or exploitation of sex workers, rather than enhancing it. See Proposed Nevada 
Prostitution Tax Dies on 3–4 Committee Vote, supra note 37 (discussing anti-trafficking 
provisions); supra note 36 (discussing the proposed use of proceeds). 
 61. Rob Stein, N.Y. To Pay For Eggs For Stem Cell Research, WASH. POST, June 26, 
2009, at A4.  
 62. Id. (reporting opposition to nonaltruistic oocyte donation); Petition at 2, Feminists 
Choosing Life of N.Y. v. Empire State Stem Cell Bd., No. 8594 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 9, 
2009) (challenging the New York program); Cathleen F. Crowley, Abortion Foes 
Challenge Pay for Egg Donors, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 15, 2009, at A3 
(reporting on the lawsuit filed by the New York anti-abortion group Feminists Choosing 
Life against the New York State Stem Cell Board). 
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donation and other types of human tissue and plasma donation), this 
section focuses on one notable distinction between egg and sperm 
markets: presumed donor motivations and the resulting attempts to 
cap egg donor compensation.63 
A. Price Controls in the Egg Market 
In the United States, payment has long been provided for eggs 
and sperm used in fertility treatments. Data suggest that in 2006 alone 
nearly 55,000 children in the United States were born through 
assisted reproduction, more than 9,000 of whom were created through 
the use of “donated” eggs.64  
Notwithstanding this active oocyte market, controversy 
continues to surround the issue of payments to egg donors. Despite 
the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, many contend that egg 
donors are—and should be—motivated primarily by altruism and a 
desire to help the infertile, rather than by the desire for monetary 
compensation. This insistence is evident in egg donor recruitment 
 
 63. Due to NOTA’s ban on organ donor compensation (which is defined to include 
bone marrow), there is no legal market in human organs or bone marrow, and severe 
shortages exist. Krawiec, supra note 5, at vii–viii (discussing NOTA’s ban on 
compensation and resulting organ shortages and controversy); see also Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–51, Flynn v. Holder, No. CV-09-07772 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 26, 2009) (challenging NOTA’s ban on compensated bone marrow donation). Plasma, 
in contrast, is not covered by NOTA and payment is commonplace. See Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 59, 85–87 (comparing and contrasting plasma 
donation with egg donation and discussing antitrust action). In the United States, blood is 
typically procured from donors who receive no monetary compensation, but who may 
receive other rewards, such as t-shirts, jackets, coolers, blankets, and gift cards. See Nicola 
Lacetera, Mario Macis & Robert Slonim, Will There Be Blood? Incentives and Substitution 
Effects in Pro-social Behavior 7 (Inst. for Study of Lab. (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 4567, 
2009), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp4567.pdf. Finally, as elaborated in this section, the 
sperm market is robust, and appeals to donor altruism are rare. Markets in breast milk, 
while more controversial, appear similarly active. See generally Linda C. Fentiman, 
Marketing Mothers’ Milk: The Commodification of Breastfeeding and the New Markets for 
Human Milk and Infant Formula, 10 NEV. L.J. 29 (2009) (discussing the market for breast 
milk); Sarah Waldeck, Encouraging a Market in Human Milk, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
361, 362 (2002) (discussing altruistic breast milk donation programs and advocating 
markets in breast milk to increase supply).  
  Thus the oocyte market, consisting of transactions that are touted as altruistic, yet 
in which large sums change hands, and a market that is theoretically competitive, but 
characterized by open industry price-fixing, is not comparable to other transactions 
involving human tissue or fluids. 
 64. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: 
NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 13, 56–59 (2008) (providing data 
on assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) births and ART births using donor eggs, 
from which the number of donor egg births is estimated).  
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materials, which nearly always reference altruistic motivations and 
the ability to help others.65 It is also evident in fertility-center and 
donor-agency screening practices that eliminate as unacceptable 
potential egg donors who claim monetary compensation as the 
overriding motivation for egg donation.66 Indeed, donor-agency staff 
express disgust and revulsion toward egg donors just in it “ ‘for the 
money’ ”67 or “attempt[ing] to make a ‘career’ ” out of egg donation.68 
At some level, this insistence on the altruistic motives of egg 
donors is driven by customer demand: donor-agency staff report a 
belief that fertility customers do not want egg donors who reveal 
monetary motivations for the desire to donate,69 and sociological 
research has shown that donor-agency staff spend significant amounts 
of time coaching egg donors, but not sperm donors, on how to 
appropriately package their personalities and their reasons for 
wanting to become a donor.70 That package includes a desire to help 
those who are infertile and downplays profit motivations. 
Moreover, egg donors themselves may contribute to this 
discourse. Like surrogates, many egg donors report other-regarding 
motivations as at least a partial rationale for their decision to 
donate.71 In addition to normalizing what is otherwise a jarring 
dichotomy (mothers are supposed to love their offspring, not transfer 
them for money), there is an obvious appeal to believing that one’s 
selfless behavior helps another.72 
 
 65. See Krawiec, supra note 63, at 60–61 (discussing egg donor ads and recruitment 
materials). 
 66. Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and 
the Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 319, 327–34 (2007) (discussing 
egg donor screening practices). 
 67. Id. at 327 (quoting the director of an egg agency). 
 68. Id. at 334. 
 69. As one egg donor-agency director stated, “ ‘[Customers] want to know that the 
person donating is a good person. They want to know that person wasn’t doing it for the 
money.’ ” Id. at 327. 
 70. Id. at 329–30. 
 71. HELENE RAGONÉ, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 
52–68 (1994) (reporting the results of surrogate interview-based research); Katherine 
Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Uniformity, J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS, Spring 2007, at 300, 304–06 (reviewing surrogacy studies); L.R. Shover, S.A. 
Rothmann & R.L. Collins, The Personality and Motivation of Semen Donors: A 
Comparison with Oocyte Donors, 7 HUM. REPROD. 575, 575–79 (1992) (studying a sample 
of egg and sperm donors and finding that sperm donors are significantly more likely to 
report solely or primarily profit motives, whereas egg donors are more likely to report 
solely or primarily altruistic motives).  
 72. See RAGONÉ, supra note 71, at 85–86 (noting that surrender of a child is 
considered counter to maternal instinct and that a surrogate’s decision to give up her child 
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But the presumption that women should donate oocytes out of 
altruism is echoed by the media, the general public, and by many 
academics and ethicists.73 In the face of such social pressure, the 
stated motivations of donors are obviously suspect.74 Experience 
suggests that such fuzzy feelings alone are generally insufficient to 
induce egg donors into uncompensated donations for strangers. 
Instead, the experience of the stem cell industry and of countries 
(such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada) with restrictive 
laws curtailing egg donor compensation illustrate the limitations of a 
reliance on female altruism alone, as each has experienced severe egg 
shortages.75 
These concerns regarding compensated egg donation are 
reflected in the payment caps adopted in New York: the Empire State 
Stem Cell Board resolution requires researchers to follow the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) 
compensation guidelines,76 which state that “sums of $5,000 or more 
require justification and sums above $10,000 are not appropriate.”77 
As I demonstrate at length elsewhere, the ASRM-SART (Society For 
Assisted Reproductive Technology) oocyte-donor compensation 
 
“may appear incomprehensible within the context of the values associated with 
motherhood in American culture”). 
 73. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 63 at 72–76; id. at 84–85 (detailing various objections 
to compensated egg donation, at least beyond certain levels); Stein, supra note 61 (quoting 
various critics of the New York decision to compensate egg donors in connection with 
stem cell research). 
 74. Moreover, egg donors, but not sperm donors, are recruited with materials that 
highlight the ability to help others, rather than the ability to earn money; egg donors 
reporting primarily financial motivations for the decision to donate are excluded from 
consideration as donors; and donor-agency staff frequently coach egg donors, but not 
sperm donors, on the need to express altruistic motives for the donation in order to appeal 
to prospective purchasers, all of which skew such results. See supra notes 65–70 and 
accompanying text; see also Drabiak et al., supra note 71, at 305 (“[S]urrogates’ responses 
regarding income received from any contract may represent a kind of social response bias, 
in which surrogates who have been interviewed feel socially pressured to provide a socially 
acceptable justification for their activity.”). 
 75. Krawiec, supra note 63, at 66 n.30 (discussing reproductive tourism in the United 
States prompted by other countries’ restrictions on paid oocyte donation); id. at 72 n.66 
(discussing restrictions on oocyte payments for stem cell research and resulting shortages). 
 76. Empire State Stem Cell Bd., Resolution of the Funding Comm. Regarding 
Recommended Standards for the Comp. of Women Donating Oocytes Solely for Research 
Purposes (June 11, 2009), http://stemcell.ny.gov/docs/Compensation_of_Gamete_Donors 
_resolution_of_Funding_Comm.pdf. 
 77. The Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., ASRM Ethics Committee 
Report: Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 308 
(2007). 
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guidelines amount to horizontal price-fixing of the type long 
considered per se illegal in other industries.78 
B. The Cost of Donor Caps 
The New York payment limits are sufficiently high that they are 
unlikely to have any practical effect on the ability to recruit and pay 
egg donors for stem cell research. Nonetheless, the trend of formally 
limiting compensation to women for the provision of a valuable, time-
consuming, and uncomfortable service that poses some health risks is 
disturbing for several reasons. 
First, The ASRM-SART oocyte-donor compensation guidelines 
may depress the price of some eggs used in fertility treatments, 
depending on the effectiveness of those guidelines. Such price 
suppression would entail real costs to both consumers of fertility 
services, in the form of higher prices and less consumer choice, and to 
oocyte providers, in the form of lost compensation.79 
Though egg donor compensation data is of questionable 
reliability,80 egg donor rates in the United States appear to vary 
widely, with prices as low as $1,500 and as high as $150,000 reported, 
though there are allegations that offers at the high end of this 
spectrum are fraudulent advertisements designed to increase 
agencies’ donor pools.81 Surveys of fertility clinics and donor agencies 
listed with SART report less stratospheric numbers: average 
compensation rates per donation cycle of $4,217 and $5,200, 
respectively, although these figures may understate actual averages.82  
 
 78. See generally Krawiec, supra note 63. 
 79. Id. at 81–83 (discussing the effects of a successful ASRM-SART pricing 
agreement and of competitive monopsonies more generally). 
 80. Systematic egg donor compensation data derives from two sources: (1) self-
reported egg donor agency and fertility center information and (2) egg donor ads taken 
from college newspapers, the Internet, campus marketing materials, and the like. See id. at 
66 & n.31. The self-reported data, though collected anonymously, unsurprisingly suggests 
that SART-affiliated clinics and agencies are in compliance with ASRM-SART member 
and affiliate self-regulatory guidelines. See id. at 75. This information must be approached 
with the same caution accorded other declarations of compliance with industry self-
regulation. The second source reveals only the initial offer price, rather than the purchase 
price, which could be higher (if desirable egg donors negotiate upward) or lower (if, as has 
been alleged, many very high monetary offers are fraudulent attempts to increase an 
agency’s donor pool). Cf. id. at 66–67, 88–89 (discussing both data sources and their 
limitations in more detail). 
 81. Id. at 66–67, 89 n.165; ADVISORY GROUP ON ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS., N.Y. 
STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG DONOR? 7 
(2009), available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/publications/1127.pdf. 
 82. Sharon N. Covington & William E. Gibbons, What Is Happening to the Price of 
Eggs?, 87 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1001, 1002–03 (2007) (reporting averages from a 
KRAWIEC.PTD5 6/29/10 7:38 PM 
2010] A WOMAN’S WORTH 1761 
 
A comparison of this admittedly imperfect egg donor 
compensation survey data to sperm donor compensation data 
provides some support for theories of price suppression: egg and 
sperm donors receive a roughly equal average hourly compensation 
of between $75 and $93 for time spent in a medical setting.83 This is 
despite the fact that—because egg donation requires hormone 
therapy, whereas sperm donation does not—egg donors face pain, 
discomfort, and health risks not faced by sperm donors, and these 
risks and side effects extend beyond the time spent in a medical 
setting.84 Presumably egg donors would demand and—under normal 
market conditions—receive, additional compensation due to these 
factors. 
Yet, sperm donor compensation has generated comparatively 
little controversy or discussion in the United States.85 Indeed, the 
insistence on the altruistic motivations of egg donors is in stark 
contrast to the presumed motivations of sperm donors, who are 
recruited through materials that ask, “Why not get paid for it?” and 
advertise, “your sperm can earn!”86 This belief that sperm donors are 
motivated primarily by a desire for monetary compensation is so 
persistent that potential donors expressing altruistic motivations are 
frequently viewed with suspicion and presumed to harbor an 
egomaniacal desire to propagate.87  
Even if the apparent undercompensation of egg donors is the 
result of survey underreporting, as opposed to successful price 
suppression, one must still question what other purpose the ASRM-
SART agreement serves. ASRM, SART, and SART-member clinics, 
doctors, and affiliated egg donor agencies spend time, effort, and 
 
survey of SART-affiliated clinics, and from agency Web sites that are registered with 
SART). 
 83. Krawiec, supra note 63, at 66–67 (demonstrating the sources for, and calculations 
of, these figures). 
 84. Id. at 63–65. 
 85. Id. at 70–71. A review of sperm bank Web sites suggests that payments of between 
$50 and $100 per usable sample are common. This is consistent with the $75 figure 
reported by other sources as the national average. Many sperm banks increase payment 
levels upon the completion of stated goals and pay bonuses for a variety of acts, including 
the successful referral of another sperm donor, completing the six-month exit blood test, 
and agreeing to the release of identifying information to offspring. Id.  
 86. Id. at 71. 
 87. Id. at 71–72. Both stereotypes are gross oversimplifications of the motives of egg 
and sperm donors, the bulk of whom express a mix of altruistic and monetary motivations 
for their decision to donate. Shover et al., supra note 71, at 575–76 (discussing self-
reported motivations of egg and sperm donors); supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text 
(discussing differential recruitment, selection, and other factors that likely skew such 
findings). 
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money creating (at a minimum) the appearance of cartel 
enforcement.88 Yet, cartels are notoriously difficult to sustain. Why 
exert such effort, if not in the pursuit of above-market profits? 
The most plausible alternative scenario is a desire to avoid 
industry controversy, including controversy related to egg donor 
compensation. Negative public attitudes toward fertility treatments 
threaten to prompt into action state and federal lawmakers that, to 
date, have been largely content to rely on industry self-regulation of 
the fertility market.89 Yet this political-motivation narrative does not 
undermine the central precept of this Article and, in fact, reinforces 
it: the same market forces that are allowed to determine the price of 
other products and services, including the price of male reproductive 
tissue, are anathema in the context of female reproduction. The 
fertility industry may correctly fear that, perceiving a market run 
amok with the potential to commodify women and children and 
coerce and exploit egg donors, the natural impulse would be top-
down state or federal regulation of the entire industry.  
Finally, the continued insistence that egg donors are, and should 
be, motivated primarily by altruism and the desire to help others, 
rather than by the desire for monetary compensation, poses more 
subtle, intangible dangers. Many scholars have argued, for example, 
that the presumption that much valuable female labor should spring 
from altruistic motives threatens to reinforce gendered notions that 
the market activities of women are driven in large part by altruism 
and that women as a group are uninterested in reaping the full gains 
of trade from the provision of their goods and services.90 
More directly, there is significant societal pressure for egg donors 
to profess altruistic motives, and oocyte donor agencies and 
consumers dislike egg donors who appear overly money-motivated. 
Do these attitudes affect compensation negotiations? Are prospective 
 
 88. Krawiec, supra note 63, at 73–76 (detailing enforcement efforts).  
 89. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Why We Should Ignore the “Octomom”, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 120 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/ 
colloquy/2009/34/LRColl2009n34Krawiec.pdf (discussing fertility industry self-regulation 
and the threat posed by public controversy). 
 90. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1129, 1143 (2005) 
(“Much of what women have market power over, such as their . . . reproductive services, 
they have long been expected not to commodify at all. Even when monetary compensation 
is allowed, it is often kept low and female providers are expected to be interested in 
rewards other than money.”); Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 163, 188 (2000) (“[T]he implication that young women should desire to undergo a 
series of highly uncomfortable procedures that pose both short-term and long-term risks 
to their physical well-being for which they will not collect the market clearing price 
threatens to reinforce stereotypes of females as generous rather than self-interested.”). 
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oocyte donors able to drive the hardest economic bargain without 
signaling a disqualifying character flaw—an overriding interest in 
monetary compensation? In the absence of accurate oocyte pricing 
data it is impossible to know for sure, but the possibility cannot be 
ignored. 
Absent a significant shift in the societal conception of 
motherhood, it may be the case that appeals to altruistic impulses will 
always play a vital role in the manner by which our society 
understands egg donation and even in the way that egg donors 
understand themselves. But the fertility and stem cell industries are 
big business in this and other countries, and the persistent dialogue of 
gift-giving and altruistic donation that surrounds egg “donation” may 
help to obscure both its highly commercial nature and the potential 
industry benefits, economic and political, of controlling the oocyte 
market. 
C. The Alleged Benefits of Donor Caps 
This insistence that egg donors—unlike sperm donors—should 
be motivated by altruism, rather than by profit-seeking, and the 
resulting attempts to limit egg donor compensation, thus impose 
potential costs on the marketplace and those who transact in it. What 
are the purported benefits that justify such costs? 
Although some of the resistance to oocyte markets doubtless 
stems from their perceived similarity to organ markets and the 
invasiveness of the procedure (characteristics not shared by sperm 
markets),91 as with many other taboo markets, it is important to 
scrutinize our resistance to such transactions carefully. Often, these 
intuitions are laden with unrecognized class prejudices and anxiety 
about the body, especially women’s bodies, that have little relation to 
the stated objections to the underlying transaction.92 
 
 91. Unlike renewable tissue, such as sperm and plasma, for which compensation has 
long been accepted, eggs are a technically nonrenewable but realistically unlimited tissue. 
Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 
BYU L. REV. 107, 127 (noting that the average woman has over 400,000 pre-oocytes at 
puberty, yet will menstruate only about 500 times in her life, meaning that under normal 
conditions no woman will ever use up all her eggs, even if many are donated to others). 
The failure to understand this biological fact may contribute to egg donation fears. The 
process by which egg extraction occurs—outpatient surgery—is also different and more 
invasive than the process by which sperm donation occurs. This alone, however, should 
not—and under current law, does not—dictate whether eggs are more like organs than 
like sperm. 
 92. NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at 280 (arguing that commodification and coercion 
objections are frequently laden with class, gender, and sometimes racial stereotypes); see 
Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
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The insistence that—like virginity—female reproductive material 
should be provided altruistically, despite its high economic value, is 
typically defended by reference to the same commodification and 
coercion objections discussed in prior sections of this Article.93 Yet 
these arguments have no more persuasive power in the context of egg 
donor compensation caps than in the contexts of virginity sales or 
Nevada’s brothel tax. As is true in all of the examples invoked here, 
anticommodification objections are a poor fit in the face of a multi-
million dollar, highly commercial industry. 
In this context, yet again, the commodification objection seems 
an especially implausible vehicle through which to raise concerns 
about societal degradation or the economic and social well-being of 
women. In an economic exchange that requires an oocyte for 
completion, does limiting the monetary benefit of only a single 
actor—the egg donor herself—significantly reduce any degrading 
effects of what remains a highly profitable and expensive economic 
transaction? 
Perhaps. One challenge to countering commdodification 
objections is that they do not lend themselves to ready measurement, 
and thus refutation. At a minimum, however, commodification 
adherents should be more skeptical of such objections, given the 
significant industry interests at stake. 
Regarding coercion, oocyte donation presents health risks that 
sperm donation does not.94 But this alone cannot justify attempts to 
restrict compensation. Indeed, in other contexts, one would anticipate 
the opposite: wage premia sufficient to compensate for the additional 
risk, pain, and discomfort. 
The widely articulated coercion concern raised against 
compensated egg donation is particularly one that should be carefully 
scrutinized for class and gender bias. There are many dangerous jobs 
regularly performed for compensation, often by employees with 
lower socio-economic status and education levels than egg donors 
(who are often valued for their academic credentials, among other 
characteristics).95 Those jobs are also performed primarily, if not 
exclusively, by men. For example, fishing, logging, aircraft pilot, and 
 
REV. 1108, 1111 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s nude dancing cases make little 
sense, unless viewed through the lens of “sexual panic driven by dread of female 
sexuality”). 
 93. See supra sources cited notes 9 and 77. 
 94. Krawiec, supra note 63, at 63–65 (discussing these risks). 
 95. Krawiec, Altruism & Intermediation, supra note 6, at 222 (discussing factors that 
impact oocyte pricing). 
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construction top the list of the most dangerous jobs,96 and more than 
ninety-two percent of all workplace fatalities are men.97 Yet, wage 
capping of these occupations is not suggested as an appropriate 
response to the jobs’ inherent dangers. Nor are industry collusion or 
government regulation to limit worker compensation invoked as 
necessary mechanisms to “protect” these employees from financial 
coercion.  
Finally, maximum wage restrictions are an odd—even 
backwards—response to concerns over the financial coercion of poor 
women. The ability of any sum to coerce action is a direct function of 
that person’s financial need. Egg donor compensation caps, without 
reference to the potential donor’s financial status, do nothing to 
address financial coercion objections. Ironically, the most likely effect 
of a successful ASRM-SART price cap would be to drive from the 
market the most highly valued egg donors, who tend to be better-
educated and of a higher socioeconomic status. These donors should 
be in a better position to evaluate the risks of egg donation against 
the monetary benefits and should be less susceptible to the “coercive” 
effects of monetary compensation, because they are more likely to 
have other income opportunities from which to choose. 
IV.  GIFTING VERSUS OUTSOURCING 
Because I discuss commercial surrogacy at length elsewhere, I 
address the issue only briefly here. However, commercial surrogacy 
(and its legal limitations) is strikingly similar to the other taboo trades 
discussed in this Article, particularly egg donation. 
Although many countries strictly regulate or even ban 
commercial surrogacy, United States federal law does not directly 
address the matter, resulting in wide variation across states.98 Some 
states, for example, adopt relatively surrogacy-friendly provisions, 
either through legislative or judicial action, that seek to rely on the 
 
 96. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. OF DEP’T LABOR, CENSUS OF FATAL 
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES SUMMARY, 2008 (2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/ 
news.release/cfoi.htm; Klaus Kneale, Fishermen, Loggers Have Most Dangerous Jobs: 
Annual Ranking See Familiar Industries, Men Are Vast Majority of Fatalities, FORBES, 
Sept. 8, 2009, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32725485/. 
 97. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 96, tbl.4; Kneale, supra note 96.  
 98. See Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby M: International Perspectives on Gestational 
Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary Biological Mother, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 193, 
214–21 (1996) (noting the “federal legislative vacuum” in the United States on the issue of 
surrogacy and reviewing surrogacy legislation in foreign countries that generally prohibit 
commercial surrogacy). 
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parties’ intent at the time of contracting.99 Other states are less 
embracing of commercial surrogacy. Some declare commercial 
surrogacy contracts void or unenforceable, and others have ruled such 
contracts illegal, with accompanying fines and other criminal 
penalties.100  
Even jurisdictions in which commercial surrogacy is legal, 
however, may impose legal limitations that impede operation of the 
surrogacy market and, particularly, that restrict compensation to 
commercial surrogates. For example, the unenforceability of 
surrogacy contracts in some jurisdictions profoundly impacts market 
organization, empowering surrogacy intermediaries, particularly 
incumbent intermediaries with established market positions and 
reputational capital.101 Moreover, many jurisdictions impose limits on 
surrogate compensation, often restricting payment to necessary living, 
medical, and other expenses.102  
This inequity is not lost on critics of the surrogacy market, who 
have noted that commercial surrogacy profits appear unevenly 
distributed. The surrogate payment is dwarfed by the total price paid 
by the intended couple, which includes an agency fee and medical and 
legal expenses.103  
 
 99. See Drabiak et al., supra note 71, at 300, 302 (discussing various state regimes); 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer 2009, at 109, 123–25 (discussing modern developments in state surrogacy 
statutes, which increasingly aim to reduce uncertainty and establish more efficient 
procedures for determining legal parentage). 
 100. Drabiak et al., supra note 71, at 302–03. 
 101. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation, supra note 6, at 234–35. 
 102. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2009) (limiting the permissible compensation 
in surrogacy contracts); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (LexisNexis 2004) (allowing 
surrogacy contracts, but restricting payment to living and medical expenses related to the 
birth); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:16 to 168-B:25 (LexisNexis 2001) (regulating 
surrogacy contracts in great detail, and limiting permissible surrogacy fees and payments); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803 (2008) (restricting surrogacy payments to reasonable 
amounts); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-160 (2008) (limiting compensation to 
reasonable medical expenses and ancillary costs); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210 to 
26.26.240 (West 2005) (permitting surrogacy contracts, but prohibiting contracts for 
compensation beyond medical costs, other expenses related to pregnancy, and legal fees). 
 103. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 623, 635 (1991) (“The couple who contracts with a paid surrogate will spend at 
least $25,000: approximately $10,000 for the surrogate mother, $10,000 for the agency that 
arranges the procedure, as well as related miscellaneous costs.”); Krim, supra note 98, at 
224 (stating that surrogacy brokers often earn “as much, if not more, than surrogates”); 
Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 67, 87 (2007) (noting that the fee to surrogacy brokers is often close to or 
equal to that paid to the surrogate and that “the fees paid to surrogates . . . are fairly 
low”). 
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As I demonstrate at length elsewhere, large surrogacy agency 
fees are partially attributable to the important intermediary functions 
of search, matching, and quality guarantee performed by surrogate 
agencies.104 However, legal uncertainty surrounding surrogacy 
contracts enhances the role of intermediaries in the market, 
increasing both the demand for intermediary services and their share 
of the total price paid for surrogacy arrangements.105 Restrictions on 
payments to surrogates—to the extent that they are effective—would 
have the same impact. 
As in the case of the egg market, scarce systematic data on 
surrogate compensation and the malleability of formal surrogate 
payment limits renders concrete conclusions regarding the impact of 
the legal and social constraints on surrogacy markets difficult. Yet the 
same questions must be asked: do attempts to cap surrogate 
compensation and the persistent dialogue of altruistic donation in the 
surrogacy market thwart the earning potential of surrogates as a 
group or foster stereotypes of women as altruistic to the point of 
disinterest in the monetary returns from their labor? And if so, for 
what benefit?  
CONCLUSION 
My thesis in this Article is a relatively narrow one: given the 
transactions that we accept as legally and socially valid, 
commodification and coercion objections seem especially implausible 
vehicles through which to defend the specific constraints on taboo 
trades identified in this Article. In particular, anticommodification 
objections are a poor fit in the face of extensive, profitable, and highly 
 
 104. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation, supra note 6, at 234–38, 245 (detailing 
intermediary functions in the baby market).  
 105. If there is a risk of litigation over custody of the child after birth, screening out 
surrogates who may attempt to keep the child after delivery is an important intermediary 
function, and one that grows in importance as uncertainty over legal enforceability 
increases. Intermediating this uncertainty is a primary function of many surrogacy 
agencies, and one at which incumbents with significant reputational capital excel. Thus, 
some portion of price is necessarily diverted to this function. Unless the demand for 
surrogacy services is completely price insensitive (imperfect substitutes, including 
adoption, exist), then total surrogate compensation is reduced, and the supply of surrogacy 
services is constrained. See Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation, supra note 6 at, 234–38, 
45 (discussing intermediation in the surrogacy market); cf. Richard A. Posner, The Ethics 
and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 21, 23 (1989) (“Because surrogacy is so much less attractive to the father and 
wife when it is not enforceable, they will not be willing to pay nearly as much as they 
would if it were enforceable—so the surrogate is hurt.”); Sanger, supra note 103, 80–82 
(discussing the role of commercial surrogacy intermediaries in minimizing the effects of 
legal uncertainty). 
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commercial industries built around the provision of female 
reproductive and sexual labor. Against this backdrop, the notion that 
commodification dangers are substantially tempered through 
stigmatization, or restrictions on the autonomy or earning capacity of 
the lowest-wage provider in an extensive supply chain, seems 
misguided. 
Note that these are not mere slippery slope arguments—that 
because sex and reproduction have become highly commercialized, 
attempts to limit further market invasions of these sacred territories 
are fruitless. Rather, the claim is that the restrictions on taboo 
markets that I identify here do not—and are not intended to—protect 
sex, human eggs, or surrogacy services from the incursion of market 
forces. Instead, they are asymmetric legal and social restrictions 
whose primary purpose and effect is to impede market access by 
suppliers of these taboo goods and services, with resulting societal 
costs. Meanwhile, market operation continues, though often in a 
stunted or dysfunctional manner. 
The coercion defense fares no better. Far from saving the 
poorest and most vulnerable from tragic choices, the restrictions on 
taboo markets explored here impede earnings or market entry, 
increase risk, or raise social stigma, making the market less attractive. 
Yet underlying economic and social disparities ensure that, for those 
with few other viable income opportunities, sex, eggs, and surrogacy 
services will continue to be sold. 
In this regard, the theory of “a woman’s worth” proposed here 
harkens back to both Martha Nussbaum and Margaret Radin, each of 
whom articulate well the notion that, when it comes to taboo 
markets—and especially taboo markets involving women’s 
reproductive or sexual labor—we do not regulate on a clean slate. 
Instead, the market, social norms, and prior legal rules are likely to 
embed class, gender, race, and other hierarchies that reflect the pre-
existing distribution of wealth and power.106 
Radin reminds of the “gap between the ideals we can formulate 
and the progress we can realize,” advocating incomplete 
commodification in recognition of that fact.107 When that incomplete 
commodification takes the form of specific measures designed to 
address public policy concerns (for example, disease control in the 
 
 106. NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at 297 (cautioning that “it seems a dead end to 
consider prostitution in isolation from the other realities of working life of which it is a 
part”); RADIN, supra note 5, at 123–30 (discussing the double bind). 
 107. RADIN, supra note 5, at 123. 
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case of prostitution, or the welfare of children in the case of 
reproductive markets) or informational or bargaining power 
disparities,108 Radin’s theory of incomplete commodification is in 
symmetry with my own theories of taboo trades. 
Yet, I am less receptive than Radin to claims that either 
commodification or economic coercion concerns should inform our 
restrictions on the taboo trades discussed here. The dangers of 
reinforcing class, race, and gender bias are too high, and the supposed 
benefits of such restraints too amorphous, to withstand critical 
inquiry. 
Instead, what seems to unify reactions to the taboo trades that 
are the subject of this Article is an attempt to normalize otherwise 
jarring economic transactions that offend societal sensibilities, 
prompting feelings of disgust, repugnance, or shame. The specific 
mechanisms by which this normalization occurs vary across settings—
stigmatization in the case of virginity sales and other sex work, and 
the romantic recharacterization of a monetary transaction into an 
altruistic one, in the case of oocyte and surrogacy sales. Yet both 
mechanisms represent an attempt to relegate these taboo trades to 
the shadows, where they are less overt and thus less destabilizing to 
societal norms. 
This uneasy accommodation of market forces has consequences 
for all who are impacted by these taboo trades. Most relevantly for 
this Article, suppliers may suffer direct and tangible, though difficult 
to assess, wage and market entry effects, as well as less direct 
expressive effects. Consumers should suffer corresponding costs: 
reduced supply, less choice, and (in the case of oocyte and surrogacy 
sales) higher prices.109 Finally, to the extent that these taboo trades 
produce negative externalities or impact broader social goals 
(including public health, disease control, and the welfare of children), 
relegating them to the political and legal shadows may thwart the 
development of sound public policies designed to minimize such 
costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 108. See generally Krawiec, Price & Pretense, supra note 6 (discussing public policy 
concerns raised by baby markets). 
 109. As noted, given certain assumptions, the stigmatization of sex work may reduce 
both the supply of sex work and the price paid. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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